New digital technology puts pressure on long-established governmental forms (hierarchies) while also 23 opening up opportunities for cooperation that span traditional institutional boundaries (networks). The 24 purpose of this article is to understand network dynamics, and to investigate the relationship between 25 leadership in networks and the capacity to implement digital innovations.
26
Increasingly, Norwegian municipalities are developing a variety of joint ICT-supported services across 27 municipal and institutional boundaries (Jacobsen, 2014) . Municipal cooperation is not a new organiza-28 tional form; however, the scale has gained momentum in recent years, not least because of technology. 29 Local municipalities join forces to master complicated projects such as building ICT infrastructure, to 30 gain access to expertise, reduce costs, enhance e-services and ultimately share case processing and joint 31 service production (Baldersheim et al., 2008 , Haug, 2009 , Haug, 2014 . The main advantage is that a 32 fusion of technical and organizational networks provides local politicians and public service managers 33 with a new way of thinking about the relationship between the functioning of local administration and 34 the structure of municipalities (Haug, 2009 ). third case, ICT Haugalandet, was situated close to the lower left corner. It has a similar low level of orga-80 nizational integration as the Digital West Agder, but is much less technically integrated. The latter case 81 is particularly interesting because this network had earlier been viewed as a success story in a Nordic 82 context (Baldersheim & Øgård 2003) .
83
Placing each network as in Fig. 1 is, of course, a sweeping statement. A network might well be con-84 sidered successful despite moderate integration. Nevertheless, an important question arises: why are the 85 three networks -despite a number of similarities -positioned so differently along these dimensions? 86 Moreover, how do these networks develop through time? To answer this and related questions, we shall 87 now undertake a more detailed description of each network paying particular attention network leader-88 ship.
89 3. Network leadership as explanatory variable 90 Northouse defines leadership as 'a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to 91 achieve a common goal ' (2012:3) . Four elements in this definition should be emphasized. First, leader-92 ship is a process. Leaders continuously influence -or are influenced by -the person(s) they lead. As 93 a result, leadership is not a linear or one-way process, but an interactive practice. Second, leadership 94 emphasizes influence. Influence is about how leaders obtain power over those directed. Third, leadership 95 normally occurs in groups, which differ in size and shape A fourth key element is that leadership is 96 about pursuing goals. Leadership takes place through instructions and other means and has its effect in 97 a context where individuals and processes are moved towards a target. Based on these broad and general 98 elements, a large number of more specific leadership categories are crystallized. File: ip-1-ip170052.tex; BOKCTP/ljl p. 5 CEOs), and a General Manager (currently the ICT manager in Tynset municipality). Each municipality is 170 the formal owner of common resources. Yet, if a municipality decides to leave the group, the technology 171 stays behind. Another result of the agreement is that they act as one legal partner when dealing with 172 private ICT providers, thus gaining market power and further reductions in ICT costs. As a result, each 173 municipality is more formally as well as financially committed, although withdrawal is always an option.
174
If we take a closer look at network leadership in the Mountain region in 2006, the most prominent 175 role was the Producer. According to our informants, the network did not develop due to a top-down 176 approach or a visionary leader. On the contrary, the network emerged and developed gradually from 177 below, i.e. out of pragmatic and careful planning by the five municipal ICT-managers. As time passed, 178 the ICT personnel came to know each other -even forming friendships -while exchanging ideas about 179 technology and how to better utilize scarce resources. The process was problem-driven; based on the ex-180 perience of severe pressure of work, professional isolation, stagnation and vulnerability. Even though all 181 ICT-managers participated, the ICT-manager in Tynset municipality in alliance with his Assistant Chief 182 Administrative Officer (CEO) were identified by the informants as particularly important. They were 183 the first to put a draft agreement on paper, they designed common work processes and organizational 184 models, arranged meetings, prepared common ICT purchases as well as conducting several negotiations 185 about the location of services and designing the common work pool.
186
The network also had a clear Administrator; or rather consensus was established as to the necessity 187 of formalizing this role. Local politicians, CEOs and ICT managers all wanted 'to keep things in order'. 188 Yet none appeared as directly 'bureaucratic' in the negative connotation of the word. According to the 189 CEOs, the Administrative role has contributed to stabilizing the network, has enhanced transparency and 190 political influence, as well made it possible to fulfil legal obligations. The CEOs were also motivated by held an important position in the largest municipality, he easily gained access to political leaders in all 210 municipalities.
211
For example, he initiated the Plan of Actions, in which the local politicians consider on an annual 212 basis which ICT projects will be given priority. The plan has, according to the informants, contributed 213 significantly to increasing political governability while at the same time reducing unrealistic expecta-214 tions as to what the network is going to deliver. It prevents potential conflicts and is recognized and is accepted as sovereign and does not have to commit itself to a particular ICT project. This was an im-217 portant principle, emphasized by the assistant CEO as functioning almost as a 'valve' for the network. A 218 third integrating step, initiated by the ICT manager in Tynset, was to include 'the users' in ICT projects.
219
Permanent user groups (such as healthcare workers, teachers and administrative staff) were established 220 in relation to digital expert systems operated by the network and they continuously provide feedback. 221 This inclusive strategy also created a 'sense of belonging' and prevented negative attitudes towards ICT 222 activities. The ICT manager as well as the Assistant CEO emphasized that the comprehensive strat-223 egy resulted in far better ICT systems, eased implementation, and also legitimized technical network 224 decisions on the operative level.
225
In short, three of Adizes' four roles were apparent in the Mountain Region in 2006. However, we did 226 not find a typical Entrepreneur. Based on the conversations with the informants, there was no typical 227 enthusiast or visionary leader. The network was built as they expressed it, 'stone by stone' by Producers, 228 Administrators and Integrators.
229
Ten years later, the Mountain Region's network is still vital and functioning well. Their ICT and inno-230 vation processes remain organized as an Inter-municipal Company with no major changes. The network 231 manager is also the same person, still employed in Tynset municipality, but seconded full-time to the 232 company. The other employees are also seconded to the company for 60% of their time. The company 233 has, on behalf of the owners, duties and responsibilities similar to those in the municipalities' main-234 stream ICT units/departments. New ICT developments and rapid technological changes are analyzed The second case is the Digital District of West Agder in Southern Norway (DDV), encompassing 11 242 municipalities (2006-2012) and an estimated 57,000 inhabitants in an area of 6,250 sq km.
243
DDV consisted of three seemingly independent networks under an overarching structure. One, initi-244 ated by the municipality of Kvinesdal, was responsible for e-mail systems and web solutions. A second 245 network was IDIVA, an initiative emerging from a common accounting system for six municipalities. 246 Thirdly, common software for district nurses, home care, social welfare offices and childcare was es-247 tablished. Examples from the large portfolio included the development of a common ICT-strategy, joint 248 purchasing routines, shared servers and security systems, a joint helpdesk, IP-based telephones and 249 videoconferencing. A common 'hub' was in place in the municipality of Mandal (the largest of the 11 250 municipalities). Nevertheless, no 'pool' of ICT personnel was evident in DDV in 2006 
257
DDV was at that time managed by a highly informal council consisting of municipal CEOs under the 258 daily supervision of the CEO in Marnadal municipality. Although there was no legally binding agree-259 ment, 'authority' seems to have been exercised through the professional influence of the ICT heads, most 260 notably by the ICT team leader from Mandal. In the interviews, he appeared clearly production-oriented: 261 an ICT engineer more focused on the technical capabilities and limitations than on administration and 262 formalization of cooperation. This person also had a close relationship with the CEO in Marnadal mu-263 nicipality and worked almost as a secretary to the CEOs.
264
In DDV trust was founded on a loosely constructed and highly flexible collaboration in which pragma-265 tism, voluntarism and equality were outstanding features. This was also reflected in the fact that none of 266 the municipalities were committed to participating in projects (except basic infrastructure and security).
267
Every municipality had an equal say regardless of municipal size, effort and investment in DDV. Terms 268 used to describe the network were 'mutual trust' and 'gentlemen's agreement'.
269
Despite the network's achievements, it was striking that there was extreme caution about initiating 270 new ICT schemes that might impact on the municipalities' internal organizational structures. The ICT 271 team seemed to work somewhat in isolation although in an understanding with the CEOs. Collaboration 272 was apparently influenced by a 'twin logic': on the one hand an economic/technological logic facilitating 273 comprehensive collaboration and cost reductions due to standardization, specialization or centralization; 274 on the other hand, a political logic on the part of the CEOs, which shaped developments in proportion 275 to what was 'politically possible'. Questions such as 'do we need 11 accounting offices when we can 276 do with one' were systematically avoided. Due to the consciousness of this twin logic, the ICT team as 277 well as the CEOs 'feared' initiating ICT projects that might cause political disputes over the location of 278 services and institutions or staff reductions. File: ip-1-ip170052.tex; BOKCTP/ljl p. 8 As of 2006, only two decisions were made by the politicians: the first concerned participation in a regional broadband initiative; the second when they had to pay Ȃ 76,000 to cover the municipal part of the expenses incurred by building broadband. Thus, DDV was in 2006 by and large a technically and producer-driven process. Although there was occasionally talk about including 'the political leadership', politicians were reduced to 'walk-on' parts in a 'theatre' governed exclusively by ICT managers and CEOs. Compared to the Mountain region, DDV was in 2006 less technically and organizationally integrated. To remain undisturbed in their new 'playground', the CEOs and ICT managers chose not to involve the political level.
Can this be explained by difference in network leadership? As with the Mountain region, DDV encompassed a strong Producer role. According to our informants, this role was played largely by ICT managers through technical projects. The ICT personnel were united mainly through an informal ICT forum, which they considered to be 'highly efficient' and 'a success story'. Coordinated by the ICT manager in Marnadal municipality, the forum discussed current challenges, introduced solutions to practical problems, and initiated new projects. There was little evidence of written agreements or a long-term strategy. No record of meetings, decisions taken or budgets were kept. Still, DDV always seemed able to access external financing, such as that provided by the state for broadband initiatives. This made the network independent of 'being controlled in detail by politicians' -according to the ICT manager in Mandal, who was straightforward on this issue:
If you got money, you don't need politics!
The role of Administrator was, in other words, almost entirely absent in DDV in 2006. As mentioned above, however, this was a conscious strategy to avoid 'political interference'. As the leader of the informal steering committee put it: 'we have not been much preoccupied with formalization'. The CEO in Marnadal described it in 2006 as 'a rational marriage'.
The absence of an administrator role might also be explained by the fact that this network had a particularly well-developed Integrator. The key person mentioned spontaneously by the informants was the CEO in Marnadal municipality (usually addressed only as 'Big Per' due to his physical size as well as regional influence). Although integration in DDV was limited to administrative and technical staff, the CEOs 'connected' to local politicians from time to time and 'informed' politicians when it was considered necessary. As 'Big Per' expressed it himself:
In this collaboration it has been very little politics. The steering committee is the CEOs. We inform politicians if necessary. This is a genuine network. It only happened this way.
The CEO in Marnadal had been elected as chair of the board in IDIVA (see above) as well as head of the informal CEO forum in DDV. A combination of positions and personal capacities made this person function almost as an 'intersection' between the other CEOs, ICT managers and key political decision makers. He also gained trust because, as his own municipality did not have an ICT unit of its own, he could not be accused of 'feathering his own nest'. The ICT manager in Mandal had, by serving his CEO, developed a close relationship with 'Big Per' and functioned in 2006 almost as a professional secretary to the CEOs in DDV. As in the Mountain region, each member of the network had flexibility about participating in projects. A 'two-or-more-rule' was implemented, meaning that if more than two members wanted to collaborate on a particular ICT project, the project was defined as a 'DDV-project'. Nevertheless, the ICT manager from Mandal seemed to act as a fulcrum for most of the day-to-day coordination: he recorded and carried forward project initiatives to the CEOs, often informally through 'Big Per'. Similarly, if the CEOs had a question, much of the contact went through these two leaders. Big Per's comment File: ip-1-ip170052.tex; BOKCTP/ljl p. 9
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323
I'll just have a chat with Roy [the ICT manager in Mandal]
324 illustrates the close relationship between the head of the informal CEO steering committee and the leader 325 of the ICT forum. 'Roy' also describes this structure as informal and flexible, but still highly effective.
326
The following quote captures this efficiency argument, but also illustrates the importance of having top 327 level CEOs on board:
328
We do not have to go home to get permission 329 However, the Entrepreneur was only to some extent evident in DDV. It was difficult for the informants 330 to pinpoint one particular person as particularly creative or visionary. Elements of entrepreneurship were 331 evident in the ICT manager in Mandal, as well as the CEOs e.g. when contributing to providing financial 332 support to DDV. 338 According to the current manager, this was due to arguments about the location of services, with the 339 breakaway group wanting to keep technology in the municipalities to protect local jobs. An overall 340 management board is also in place, consisting of all nine municipal CEOs. The board is responsible 341 for the management of DDV, for setting out the e-strategy for cooperation and for budget decisions. 342 The current manager of the company cited three reasons for these changes: (a) the need for politicians 343 and administrative leaders to be in control of the costs and development; (b) the flexibility facilitated 344 by remote control technology, and (c) a need to better standardize technology by means of authority. 345 The 'voluntary procurement' and 'encouragement' strategy of 2006 gradually became inadequate: the 346 original model resulted in 'too much talk and difficulties to agree' and as he chose to formulate it: 'to 347 get an omelette, you have to break some eggs'.
348
The new DDV is currently developing several new and innovative ICT-related projects, monitoring and 349 implementing rapid technological changes, safeguarding data security, facilitating teaching, organizing 350 conferences, etc. Overall, the new DDV reflects significantly enhanced system capacity through more 351 formalized collaboration between the municipalities. In short, from a theoretical point of view, the role of 352 Administrator and the network's bureaucracy has been significantly strengthened. This clearly promotes 353 entrepreneurship and innovation. Later, however, the network went through several processes of fragmentation. Competing networks 362 emerged, and it is perhaps more precise to describe ICT Haugalandet (2006) as a system of parallel net-363 works. Yet, two structures provided some degree of integration: an informal ICT club called 'ISI' where 364 ICT managers met frequently to discuss current ICT-related issues and developments, and a coordinating 365 body consisting of all the CEOs. This group initiated several ambitious collaborative processes in which 366 all the twelve municipalities were invited to participate. However, it was not possible to identify more 367 than a very basic level of collaboration within the network. Despite a handful of ICT projects, ICT Hau- Constraints experienced by the Producers might well be explained by the fact that the role of Admin-378 istrator was by and large absent. While the ICT consultants deliberately wanted to avoid 'bureaucrati-379 zation' and 'political interference' this network was heavily dependent upon internal financial support, 380 which required political decisions at municipal level. In addition, the absence of a comprehensive agree-381 ment and functioning superstructures eventually caused promising projects to fail.
382
To understand why why the administrative role did not function properly in ICT Haugalandet, we need 383 to review the development of the network. As promising results emerged from the ICT collaboration 384 effort, combined with an increased demand in some of the municipalities for more efficient municipal 385 services, several CEOs wanted to control the regional ICT efforts. In other words, a basically bottom-up 386 approach changed from 2003 onwards into a top-down driven process. In 2005 the CEOs initiated a large 387 report, in which for the first time questions of cost reduction became a priority for the network and on 388 this basis a comprehensive agreement was designed to formalize the network structure.
389
However, in 2006, only two out of the twelve municipalities supported the initiative. Opposition came 390 from the ICT specialists who argued that further integration required more not less investment in per-391 sonnel and equipment. The differences in financial position of the network members made agreement 392 difficult and there was a general fear of job losses in the light of previous experience of attempted mu-393 nicipal amalgamation.
394
Despite the failure of the agreement, the ICT managers continued to meet informally. The network 395 was characterized as a truly useful 'arena for learning', a 'think tank' and 'innovative forum'. They even 396 tried to formalize it by establishing a more formal agreement and a steering committee. However, the 397 initiative was quickly rejected by the CEOs. One of the ICT managers described the event as follows:
398
We collaborated well. And we wanted to be more formal, but this was rejected by the CEOs. They 399 were afraid of us becoming a 'state within the state'. We have selected a leader and that is it.
400
The response of another ICT manager points to the key issue of power and control:
401
We were looked upon as a power structure. For ICT managers to 'talk together' are ok. ' The group 402 think' is not.
403
What is evident in this case, is an almost complete lack of the Integrator role. Divergent actors (pro-404 fessional forces, levels, and institutions) prevented the network from pursuing additional technical and 405 organizational integration. The table is of course simplified, and each role should not be viewed in isolation. Indeed, this study 428 confirms one Adizes' (1980) key arguments , namely that the four leadership roles are complementary.
429
The point is that each role is important for an organization to function well. This also seems the case with 430 networks. If one or more of these leadership profiles are missing or functioning poorly, technical and 431 organizational integration suffers. Furthermore, as networks lack formal authority, the balance between 432 the four PAIE-roles is different compared to traditional hierarchical public sector organizations.
433
Looking at Table 1 , a first impression is that all three networks did have a more or less functioning 434 Producer role. However, only one network at that time had recognized an Administrator role: the Moun-435 tain Region alone made an explicit point of 'keeping things in order'. This was also the most technically 436 and organizationally integrated network and has maintained a strong position in the region. A well func-437 tioning network administration was considered vital by key stakeholders. By deciding to formalize the 438 network, political participation was accomplished and recognized. In theoretical terms, the Adminis-439 trator role was flanked by a vigorous Integrator role (mobilization of political expertise). This in turn 440 facilitated a new and much needed arena for the Producers to innovate (the ICT 'pool'). In the Digital 441 District of Agder as well as ICT Haugalandet, the Administrative role was deliberately toned down in 442 2006, if not totally absent. In the former, however, innovations were limited to 'safe' projects to avoid 443 potential conflicts about the location of personnel and institutions. In the latter, the role of Integrator 444 was missing. Lacking both Integrator and Administrator, ICT Haugalandet was struggling despite ac-445 cess to the Producers and enthusiastic Entrepreneurs. Here, however, these two networks chose different 446 paths between 2006 and 2017. DDV further developed the Administrator role, ICT Haugaland did not 447 (or would not) do so. As we will see below, this is important for understanding the further network 448 dynamics and development.
449
In addition, networks to a much larger extent than hierarchies require an Integrator capable of bridging networks that do not manage to incorporate the political level, might well in the end fail not only because an important stakeholder is ignored, but because local politicians are usually well trained in negotiation and compromising.
Finally, networks do not depend on a particular Entrepreneur. As pointed out in the introduction, previous studies of leadership have revealed that public sector leaders on average emphasize the roles of Administrator (A) and Integrator (I) more than leaders in the private sector do (Strand, 2007; Agranoff, 2007) . Public organizations are typically designed to minimize private judgements, initiatives and unpredictability among public servants. The room for leadership is made tight, and the Entrepreneur has an uncertain existence in the public sector (Strand, 2007:331) . Networks seem to foster the Producer role (P) and the Entrepreneur (E). Without exception, a more or less informal ICT 'club' is established facilitating free dialogue and inspiration. These informal institutional settings facilitate alternative interpretations and critical judgements -and thus innovation. Although this varies, there is reason to believe that networks complement traditional public sector leadership by enabling innovation.
However, innovation does not depend on access to a particular 'Entrepreneur'. In the Mountain Region, which mainly lacked this figure, significant innovation still emerged, although 'stone by stone'.
